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refugees who want to return to 
~o&ovia.  After several requests from 
the UNHCR, Charles Taylor has formed 
a one-man repatriation commission that 
has no facilities to operate. Despite 
IGNU's efforts to repatriate all refugees 
before elections are held, it is unlikely 
that a mass repatriation will take place 
before a political settlement is achieved. 
However, there can be no settlement 
until fair and free elections are held. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
As with most refugee situations, the 
Liberian refugee crisis can best be solved 
through voluntary repatriation. The 
longer the refugees stay in asylum coun- 
tries, the more difficult the process of 
repatriation and reintegration will be. 
The absence of a recognized government 
should not undermine repatriation ef- 
forts. International organizations should 
adapt to unusual situations and negoti- 
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ate with de fado governments to resolve 
refugee crises. The protection of refu- 
geeslretumees should be discussed in 
all peace talks, and organizations re- 
sponsible for the protection of refugees 
should advocate that cause. In a situa- 
tion where the political conflict is unre- 
solved but where there is no military 
confrontation-as is the case in many 
counties in Liberia-repatriation is pos- 
sible. The system, however, has to be 
flexible enough to allow for assistance in 
such circumstances and to organize 
mass repatriation to areas of relative 
tranquillity without formal agreement 
by govemments. The most important 
factor is to guarantee the protection of 
returnees. This can be achieved through 
negotiations with the ruling factions of 
the areas to which the refugees wish to 
return. 
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The goals of this paper are threefold: to 
provide context for the voluntary repa- 
triation program for Burundirefugees in 
Tanzania; to consider some assumptions 
inherent within it; and to describe some 
of the effects of the plan on refugees, 
particularly on members of the younger 
generation. The views are based upon 
preliminary data analysis and should be 
considered as such. 
An Overview of the Voluntary 
Repatriation Program 
Burundi nationals have now lived as 
refugees for twenty years in Tanzania. 
Their population now numbers 155,000 
officially, but is probably far more than 
that in reality. They have lived for two 
decades in Tanzania without the rights 
of citizenship and represent the survi- 
vors of the 1972 conflict in Burundi, 
which has been variously described as 
"ethnic genocide" (Lemarchard and 
Martin 1974) and "the Hutu slaughter" 
(Chretien 1990) of up to 200,000 ethnic 
Hutu (Weinstein and Schrire 1976). Sig- 
nificantly, the majority of the refugee 
population are either too young to re- 
member 1972 or were born afterwards in 
a Tanzanian refugee settlement. 
Late in 1991, a series of earlier meet- 
ings in Tanzania, Burundi and Switzer- 
land produced a repatriation plan for 
these refugees. The governments of 
Burundi and Tanzania joined with 
UNHCR to announce a coordinated plan 
for offering refugees three options re- 
garding their future. They can either re- 
turn to Burundi, elect Tanzanian 
citizenship or maintain their refugee sta- 
tus in Tanzania. 
Marc Sommers is with Boston University's Depart- 
ment of Anthropology and is currently writing 
his Ph.D. dissertation basedon research in Tanza- 
nia on Burundi refugees. 
The initiative is underway. Delegates 
from the three Burundi refugee settle- 
ments went to observe conditions in 
Burundi and Tanzanian officials, led by 
Augustine Mrema, the minister for 
Home Affairs, have also toured there. 
UNHCR should have already com- 
pleted a census of Burundi refugees and 
will now try to accommodate each refu- 
gee's choice. 
The information refugees have re- 
ceived about each option seems contra- 
dictory. The Tanzanian and Burundi 
governments have tried to pursuade 
refugees that conditions in Burundi are 
stable and peaceful, and that they are 
welcome to return. Approximately 
20,000 refugees have already quietly re- 
turned on their own. Yet opposition par- 
ties with a presence in the settlements 
suspect trouble and provide stories to 
support their claims. Palipehutu, the 
largest opposition party, has declared 
multiparty elections in Burundi a pre- 
requisite for repatriation. The Burundi 
government considers it an outlaw or- 
ganization. 
Both sides are vigorously trying to 
influence the refugees' decision. While 
the Burundi government attempts to in- 
duce refugees to return, Palipehutu and 
other opposition party members hope 
they remain in Tanzania. The environ- 
ment surrounding the refugees' decision 
is fluid and charged. 
Two Divisions among Burundi 
Refugees in Tanzania 
Much of the literature on Burundi na- 
tionals divide the population into two 
predominant groups: the Tutsi and the 
Hutu and evaluates conflicts between 
them. This implies that Burundi society 
can be understood by examining the in- 
terplay between ethnic Tutsi and Hutu. 
The accepted cause of the extraordinary 
violence of 1972 is ethnic conflict; that the 
- 
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problem arose from tensions between 
the ruling Tutsi, who represent a mere 14 
percent of the population, and the Hutu 
majority, who represent 85 percent. A 
third group, the Twa, comprise the re- 
maining one percent. Indeed, all of the 
officials I interviewed in Dar es Salaam 
and Geneva at UNHCR and Tanzania's 
Ministry of Home Affairs cited ethnic 
conflict as the source of trouble. 
While examining Burundi's prob- 
lems along a Hutu-Tutsi axis is not inac- 
curate, it is inexact and misleading. The 
government of Burundi may indeed be 
dominated by Tutsi, but primarily those 
from one segment, the Hima (see 
Lemarchand and Martin 1974). In addi- 
tion, the issue of ethnic identity in both 
Rwanda and Burundi is contentious: an 
examination of the lively debate between 
Chretien and Lemarchand, for example, 
illuminates the conflicting viewpoints. 
But moreimportant, the term "Hutu" 
also bears the general connotation of 
"Bantu." Findings in my research sug- 
gest that distinct Burundi refugee groups 
unify themselves as Hutus by their 
shared suffering at the hands of the 
Tutsi-dominated Burundi government 
(see Malkki 1989). Furthermore, refu- 
gees, particularly those with a political 
agenda, often highlight the Hutu-Tutsi 
division in descriptions to outsiders be- 
cause it facilitates the impression of refu- 
gee solidarity. Because of this, refugees 
who idenbfy splits within the refugee 
population, especially to nonrefugees, 
may invite trouble from other refugees. 
The information is volatile. 
Yet two divisions that are very mean- 
ingful to many if not most refugees 
course beneath the outward perception 
of Hutu unity. Each of these divisions 
refers to refugee society. Refugees can 
divide themselves into separate groups 
along regional or class lines, which indi- 
cate differences among them. The ethnic 
Hutu-Tutsi division, on the other hand, 
refers to life in Burundi, not Tanzania. 
During my interviews with refugees 
in Tanzania in 1991-92, many privately 
described a rift dividing all refugees into 
two regional groups. The Imbo are those 
who come from the coastal lowland ar- 
eas along Lake Tanganylka. A mixture of 
smaller regional groups comprise all 
refugees from the southern highland ar- 
eas of Burundi, the Banyaruguru, mean- 
ing, the refugees explained, "highland 
people." 
While nearly all Burundi refugees 
come from southern Burundi (together 
with the Tutsi Hirna rulers), the signifi- 
cance of this distinction may have taken 
hold only after entering Tanzanian refu- 
gee settlements. In interviews, members 
of each group communicate suspicion 
and even hostility towards the other, and 
described cultural and social differences 
between the two. Many endow deep 
meaning, for example, to the food prefer- 
ences of each group: fish and ugali (stiff 
porridge) made from cassava for the 
Imbo; beans and maize-based ugali for 
Banyaruguru. Intermarriage, some refu- 
gees told me, is strictly prohibited by 
their parents. To refugees, the term 
"Hutu" often connotes purity and good- 
ness, while "Tutsi" may connote per- 
also resent them. Educated refugees 
sometimes assume that they are the lead- 
ers and spokespeople for all Burundi 
refugees. Some even refer to the lesser 
educated as "little people." 
The legacy of the 1972 campaign 
against educated Hutu entered Tanza- 
nia with the refugees, making the role of 
educated refugees critical to understand- 
ing Burundi refugee society. Whilemany 
Burundi refugees seem to recognize 
Imbo and Banyaruguru as distinst and 
possibly enemy groups with separate 
cultures and dialects, educated refugees 
may favour educational accomplish- 
ment over regional distinction. The refu- 
gee perspectives that outsiders, notably 
UNHCR, receive are usually volun- 
teered by university-educated refugees. 
And since many may also express a po- 
litical agenda, officials might assume that 
most refugees are equally politicized. I 
have not found this to be true. 
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One cannot be sure how 
refigees will respond to the 
repaniation plan until they 
are ulh'rnately called to act. 
ceived evil oppressors. Privately casti- 
gating the other group for intermarrying 
with Tutsi and for not experiencing as 
much suffering in 1972, self-described 
Imbo and Banyaruguru each claim to be 
the "true" Hutu and thus the rightful 
owners of authority and power in 
Burundi. 
The second division, which is be- 
tween educated and uneducated refu- 
gees, separates refugees into two classes. 
For most Burundi refugees, an "edu- 
cated refugee is anyone with at least one 
year of secondary school education. This 
definition is highly charged with mean- 
ing, for the Burundi government used it 
in 1972 to target educated Hutu for elimi- 
nation (see Greenland 1974, 1980; 
Weinstein and Schrire 1976). They a p  
parently considered all members of 
this group as potential leaders of the 
opposition. 
Refugees with primary education, 
who comprise the overwhelming major- 
ity of Burundi refugees, accord respect to 
university-educated refugees. They may 
Recent Events and Refugee 
Responses to the Three Options 
Refugee concerns about the repatriation 
plan radically increased when Tanza- 
nia's minister for Home Affairs an- 
nounced last March that refugees had 
three months to decide whether to repat- 
riate or become Tanzanian citizens. He 
later expressed concern that a "second 
Burundi" might arise within Tanzanian 
borders. 
Minister Mrema's dramatic ultima- 
tum, proclaimed in newspaper head- 
lines and over the radio, was never 
upheld, but it effectively forced refugees 
to realistically reconsider their aspira- 
tions. The fact that Mrema didnot imme- 
diately mention the third option in the 
UNHCR-sponsored plan-that of re- 
maining with refugee status-made 
many refugees anxious. Minister Mrema 
soon admitted that refugees could retain 
their refugee status, but this was men- 
tioned in the Enwh-language newspa- 
per. Few refugees can read Enwh.  
How has this repatriation plan af- 
fected the aspirations of a new genera- 
tion of Burundi refugees? The answer is 
complex, and my commentary here 
should be taken a brief, informal sketch 
of the responses of some refugees to the 
current situation. Burundi refugee life is 
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rife with rumow and fear, which feed on 
each other. One cannot be sure how refu- 
gees will respond to the repatriation plan 
until they are ultimately called to ad. The 
consequences of each alternative are dra- 
matic, and so the choice to delay action is 
hardly surprising. 
My findings reflect data gathered in 
Dar es Salaam over the course of twenty 
months. I left Tanzania this past July be- 
fore the repatriation plan entered the 
implementation stage. Initial move- 
ments, however, had already begun. 
Reports on the condition of fellow refu- 
gees who had alreadyrepatriated varied 
widely. I heard nunours of repressive 
tactics by the Burundi army and stories 
that many had already returned to Tan- 
zania. However, I also heard stories of 
the peaceful existence of returnees. I 
could not substantiate any of this. The 
picture presented by UNHCR and the 
Tanzanian government was that the 
Burundi government had begun to 
peacefully integrate returnees. 
My research centred on the lives of 
young Burundi refugees in Dar es Sa- 
laam. Most reacted to the prospect of 
repatriation by avoiding thinking about 
it. This reflects their uncertainty about a 
homeland they have either never seen or 
cannot recall, but have heard fearful sto- 
ries about. Indeed, many refugees I 
spoke with, young and old, seemed to be 
taking a wait-and-see attitude, saying 
that they would like to wait perhaps 
three years to discover how those refu- 
gees who have chosen to retum have 
fared. A smaller number of refugees, 
notably educated ones, seek to retain 
refugee status in Tanzania for a pro- 
longed period. From their perspective, 
returning could mean arrest or worse. 
Some young refugees I interviewed said 
that their decision was up to their par- 
ents. If their mother and father would 
return, then they would follow. A few 
declared that older refugees might even 
retum alone to Burundi regardless of 
what occurred there. Elders, they re- 
ported, believe it is better to die at home 
than continue their refugee existence. 
Finally, becoming a Tanzanian citizen 
seemed unimaginable to many refugees, 
for it would mean relinquishing one's 
Burundi identity and risking harsh re- 
proach from other refugees. A sigrufi- 
cant number, however, may privately 
choose naturalization at a later date. 
Final Comments 
Burundi refugees fear retaliation from 
the Burundi army. Many perceive the 
Tutsi-dominated army as a force sepa- 
rate from the government and the great- 
est danger to successful repatriation. 
Reforming and integratingthe army may 
be politically difficult to resolve in 
Burundi, but is necessary to ensure 
peace. 
Most refugees are farming people 
with little education. Many I spoke with 
seem suspicious of all politics and regard 
peace and not political pluralism their 
primary concern. They told me that if the 
current government remained but the 
army approached a representative mix- 
ture of Hutu and Tutsi personnel, they 
might be sufficiently satisfied and repat- 
riate. 
Many foreign nongovernmental offi- 
cials have told me that refugees would 
be better off if they remained in Tanzania 
because Burundi has a high population 
density and Tanzania does not. Yet sig- 
nificantly, not one refugee ever ex- 
pressed this concern to me. How will this 
difference in perspective between offi- 
cials and refugees affect the resettlement 
process? 
Nonetheless, if 94,000 Burundi refu- 
gees choose to repatriate, as the planners 
have publicly predicted, is there suffi- 
cient land to resettle them all in rural 
Burundi? Unofficial estimates suggest 
that returnees might receive less than 
half the 5-8 hectare allotment refugee 
households receive in the Tanzanian set- 
tlements. Indeed, land shortages already 
seem to be presenting difficulties for the 
resettlement process. If land shortages 
continue, are there provisions and sup- 
port to retrain returnees for nonfarming 
work? 
Finally the critical question: have 
sufficient measures been undertaken to 
ensure success for the repatriation plan? 
Burundi's current president, Major 
Pierre Buyoya, has taken decisive steps 
to reform the ethnic constitution of the 
government, but are they sufficient? The 
legacy of the 197273 violence remains 
and some sources report sporadic vio- 
lence and detentions in Burundi, offer- 
ing, perhaps, dread signs of another 
tragedy. What role will Palipehutu and 
other opposition parties play in 
Burundi's future? Could intensified 
population pressure caused by resettling 
returnees in rural Burundi exacerbate 
social tensions and ignite conflict? And 
what efforts can all interested parties, 
including Western governments with 
regional influence-such as Belgium, 
France and the United States-make to 
create a stable, peaceful future in 
Burundi? 
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